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Trans-Tec Asia v. M/V
Harmony Container:
Should American Judges
Don Foreign Hats (or
Wigs)?
Anthony R. Bessette*

Abstract
The application offoreign law in U.S. federal courts is often spotty at best. Many
decisions pay lip-service to the need for international comity and the fair
application of foreign law, but this requires extensive research into a wholly
unfamiliarbody of law which courts andparties are rarely willing to do.
This article examines the Ninth Circuit'srecent decision in Trans-Tec Asia v. A/V
Harmony, a case that is indicative of this problem. Next, it argues that a more
faithful application offoreign law is both increasinglypossible and increasingly
necessary. A petitionfor certiorarihas been filed in Trans-Tec, underscoring this
growing necessity.
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of the Universiti Malaysia Terengganu, Dean Clark Williams of the University of
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I. Introduction
The application of foreign law in U.S. federal courts is often spotty at best.
Even when a case cannot be decided without applying foreign law, U.S. judges
will find a reason to apply forum law to avoid letting foreign law determine the
outcome.' Many decisions pay lip-service to the need for comity between U.S. and
foreign courts, and acknowledge that comity calls for the fair application of foreign
law. 2 Still, the gulf between the real and the ideal is large, and comity is least likely
to be achieved in cases which call for careful "analysis of and immersion in foreign
law." 3 Such cases require extensive research into a wholly unfamiliar body of law,
research which courts (and parties) are often unwilling to do.
Last year's decision in Trans-Tec Asia v. MV Harmony Container is an
example of this problem. 4 In applying Malaysian law to a non-U.S. contract, the
court cited a single Malaysian case, which was only tangentially relevant. 5 In part,
this may have been because the parties did not present the appropriate Malaysian
authorities, but the court had access to a few Malaysian cases which it ignored.
This article will examine the decision in Trans-Tec and the issues it raises.
Section II reports the factual background of the Trans-Tec case. Section III
discusses the court's decision. Section IV argues for a more complete application
of foreign law, as is advocated and to an extent practiced in continental European
jurisdictions. 6 There, judges applying foreign law enforce rights similar to those of
foreign courts when possible. 7 Section IV also predicts the likely outcome had the
court applied Malaysian law more thoroughly. Section V concludes with some
final comments.

1.

2.

3.
4.

Jacob Dolinger, Application, Proof and Interpretation of Foreign Law: a Comparative
Study in Private InternationalLaw, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 225, 266 (1995) (citing
Wood & Selick, Inc. v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 43 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1930);
Boumias v. Atlantic Maritime Co., 220 F. 2d. 152 (2d Cir. 1955)).
E.g., In re Air Crash Over Taiwan Straits on May 25, 2002, 331 F.Supp.2d 1176, 1213
(C.D. Cal. 2004); In re Disaster at Riyadh Airport, Saudi Arabia, on Aug. 19, 1980, 540
F.Supp. 1141,1154 (D.C. 1982).
Molly Warner Lien, The Cooperative and Integrative Models of International Judicial
Comity, 50 CATH. U.L. REV. 591, 606 (2001).
Trans-Tec Asia v. MN Harmony Container, 518 F.3d 1120, 2008 A.M.C. 684 (9th Cir.

2008).
5.
6.
7.

See infra note 54.
Dolinger, supra note 1, at 257-58.
G. C. CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 8 (1965).
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II. Background of the Case
Splendid Shipping SDN BHD 8 is a private Malaysian company, and owner of
the MN Harmony, a vessel flagged in Malaysia. 9 In June 2000, Kien Hung
Shipping Co., a Taiwanese entity, chartered the Harmony from Splendid for ten
years.' 0 That charter-party specifically forbade Kien Hung from incurring any liens
on the Harmony." Between 2000 and 2003, Kien Hung operated the vessel in a
loop between Japan, China, Korea, and North and South America, including
2
regular stops in Long Beach, California. 1
In February 2003, a manager at Kien Hung contacted another company, Yee
Foo Marine Industrial Co., seeking a price quote for fuel bunkers for the
3
Harmony.'
That middleman contacted a Singaporean bunker supplier, Trans-Tec
14
Asia. Trans-Tec sent a quote through the middleman to Kien Hung. 15 Kien Hung
ordered U.S. $251,850 of fuel from Trans-Tec.16 Trans-Tec sent Kien Hung a one
7
page "Bunker Confirmation" e-mail through the middleman.'

The Bunker Confirmation named the vessel and her owner,, rather than Kien
Hung, as buyer.' 9 Trans-Tec did not negotiate the bunker supply transaction with
Splendid or the master of the vessel. 20 The Bunker Confirmation purported to
incorporate Trans-Tec's "General Terms and Conditions."2' The Terms and

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

SDN BHD stands for "Sendirian Berhad," a Malaysian term roughly equivalent to "Limited
Liability Company" in U.S. law.
Trans-Tec, 518 F.3dat 1122.
Id.
Id.at 1129.
Id.at 1122.
Id.
Id. nn.98-99. Trans-Tec contended that it should be treated as a United States corporation
since its parent company is owned by World Fuel Services, a Miami-based company.
However, in its complaint Trans-Tec identified itself as a division of a corporation
organized and existing under the laws of Singapore. For the importance of labeling TransTec as Singaporean or American, see infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
Trans-Tec, 518 F.3d at 1122, 2008 A.M.C. at 685.
Id.
Id.
Id. (In this case, the Harmony and Splendid, although they were never referenced by name
in the transaction.)
Id.
Trans-Tec Asia v. MN Harmony Container (Summary Judgment), 435 F.Supp.2d 1015,
1021, n. 9 (C.D. Cal., 2005). The master of a vessel is usually an agent of the shipowner
and has authority to bind the vessel.
Trans-Tec, 518 F.3d at 1122,2008 A.M.C. at 685.
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Conditions were not attached; instead the e-mail invited Kien Hung to request a
copy.

22

Trans-Tec's Terms and Conditions included an incorporation and merger
clause, which provided that those Terms and Conditions, along with the
Confirmation, constituted the entire contract. 23 More importantly, though, it
contained a choice-of-law clause reading:
Seller shall be entitled to assert its lien or attachment in any country where it finds the
vessel. Each Transaction shall be governed by the laws of the United States and the State
of Florida, without reference to any conflict of laws rules. The laws of the United States
shall apply with respect to the existence of a maritime lien, regardless of the country in
which Seller takes legal action. 24
25
Kien Hung never saw, nor requested, a copy of the Terms and Conditions. In
February 2008, Trans-Tec delivered the bunkers in Busan (Pusan), South Korea. 6
27
Kien Hung went bankrupt in May, and never paid Trans-Tec. A German
company bought Kien Hung, took over the Harmony's charter, and the vessel
continued on to Long Beach. 5
Trans-Tec sued the Harmony in rem in the United States District Court for the
Central District of California, claiming it had a maritime lien against the vessel
under United States law, and against Splendid as her owner. 29 The district court
granted the defendants, Splendid and the Harmony (collectively "Splendid"),

summary judgment on all claims. 30 The court held that (1) Malaysian law governed

contract formation; (2) under Malaysian law, the United States choice-of-law
clause found in the Terms and Conditions was incorporated into the bunker
confirmation; 31 and (3) Trans-Tec was denied a maritime lien on the Harmony

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
Id.
Trans-Tec, 518 F.3d at 122,2008 A.M.C. at 686.
Id.
Id
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1123, 2008 A.M.C. at 686. Trans-Tec actually filed a number of in personam claims
against Splendid as well, including a maritime claim in contract and a claim for unjust
enrichment. Id.
Summary Judgment, 435 F.Supp.2d at 1041,2006 A.M.C. at 896.
In its earlier disposition, the Central District of California applied Florida law as called for
in the choice-of-law clause to determine whether that same clause, along with the rest of the
Terms and Conditions, would be incorporated. Id. at 1029-30, 2006 A.M.C. at 897. It ruled
they were not. Guided by the U.C.C., the court ruled that the addition of the Terms and
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because the Federal Maritime Lien Act32 (the "FMLA") did not grant liens to
33
"foreign necessaries providers servicing foreign-flagged ships in foreign ports."
In arriving at this decision, the court acknowledged that the Terms and Conditions
"specifically mentioned that a maritime lien was included in its choice of United
States law," but decided that it was "irrelevant because maritime liens may not
arise by contract, but only by operation of law." 34 Note that the district court's
decision defeating the lien was based on its understanding of the FMLA rather than
an analysis of Malaysian law.
Trans-Tec appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the

32.

33.
34.

Conditions would "result in surprise or hardship [if] incorporated without express
awareness . .. by the other party." Id. at 1024, 2006 A.M.C. at 874 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-207
cmt. 4). However, discussion of the U.C.C. is inapposite when applying Malaysian law to
contract formation.
46 U.S.C. § 31342 (2006). Federal control of maritime liens began with the Maritime Lien
Act in 1910. The Act superseded all state statutes that had until then granted maritime liens.
ROBERT FORCE, A.N. YIANNOPOULOS & MARTIN DAVIES, 2 ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME
LAW: PRACTITIONER'S EDITION 76 (2006). Congress amended the Act in 1920 and
reenacted it as part of the Ship Mortgage Act, 46 U.S.C. § 911. Id. The law was then
amended and reenacted as the Federal Maritime Lien Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 971-974, and
finally recodified at its present location. Id.
Trans-Tee, 518 F.3d at 1123, 2008 A.M.C. at 687.
Trans-Tec Asia v. MV Harmony Container (Lower Court Decision), 437 F.Supp.2d 1124,
1137 n.10, 2006 A.M.C. 1011, 1026 (C.D.Cal., 2006). The Supreme Court has held
likewise as early as 1856. See The Steamship Yankee Blade, 60 U.S. 82, 89 (1856);
Rainbow Line, Inc v. MA' Tequila, 480 F.2d 1024, 1026, 1973 A.M.C. 1431, 1433 (2d Cir.
1973) ("[Mlaritime liens arise separately and independently from the agreement of the
parties, and rights of third persons cannot be affected by the intent of the parties to the
contract."); see also The Bird of Paradise, 72 U.S. 545, 555 (1866); Piedmont & Georges
Creek Coal Co. v. Seaboard Fisheries Co., 254 U.S. 1, 10 (1920); GRANT GILMORE &
CHARLES BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY, § 9-1, at 481-482 (1957). Although the
doctrine is an old one, decisions among the circuits show that it still holds water. See, e.g.,
Cornish Shipping Ltd. v. International Nederlanden Bank N.V., 53 F.3d 499, 1995 A.M.C.
2582 (2d Cir. 1995); Bominflot, Inc. v. MA' Henrich S, 465 F.3d 144, 146-47, 2006 AMC
2510, 2513 (4th Cir. 2006) ("[M]aritime liens are strictijuris and cannot be created by
agreement between the parties; instead, they arise by operation of law[.]"); Redcliffe
Americas Ltd. v. MA' Tyson Lykes, 996 F.2d 47, 50, 1993 A.M.C. 2294, 2297 (4th Cir.
1993) ("[A] maritime lien is a secret one, arising by operation of law."); Silver Star
Enterprises, Inc. v. Saramacca MV, 82 F.3d 666, 1996 A.M.C. 1715 (5th Cir. 1996);
Vestoil, Ltd. v. MV M Pioneer, 148 Fed.Appx. 898, 900, 2005 A.M.C. 2404, 2407 (1Ilth
Cir. 2005) ("[lI]t is settled law in the United States that a maritime lien can arise only by
operation of law, regardless of any agreement between the parties."); see also ROBERT
FORCE & A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, 2 ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW 2-1 (2001) ("Although
parties may waive or surrender the right to a maritime lien by contract or otherwise, they
may not agree to confer a maritime lien where the law does not provide for one.").
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Ninth Circuit,35 taking issue with the district court's holding that the FMLA does
not grant liens to foreign necessaries providers servicing foreign-flagged ships in
foreign ports. Splendid cross-appealed on the grounds that the district court should
36
not have applied the U.S. choice-of-law clause.

IlI. The Decision in Trans-Tec
Because it is a legal issue, the question whether Trans-Tec enjoyed a maritime
lien was reviewed de novo. 37 The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by pointing out
the significance of the U.S. choice-of-law clause in the Terms and Conditions. The
U.S. is "one of a handful of countries that recognizes a maritime lien for the
39
38
provision of necessaries." The countries involved in the bunker sale do not.
Splendid raised two points on appeal: first, that the choice-of-law clause in the
Terms and Conditions was not incorporated into the Bunker Confirmation; and
second, that the FMLA does not apply to necessaries provided by a foreign
provider. 40 The court noted that, "[b]ecause the availability of a maritime lien
under United States law is the ultimate question, the temptation is to skip directly
to United States law," 41 but held that "[t]hat approach.. . 'put[s] the barge before
the tug."'42 Because the contract embodied in the Bunker Confirmation was not
made in the U.S. or between U.S. parties, the Ninth Circuit held that it first had to
determine which country's law governed contract formation.43 Once the court
identified the controlling foreign law, that law would control whether the choice-

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

40.
41.
42.
43.

Trans-Tec, 518 F.3dat 1120,2008 A.M.C. at684.
Id.
Id.at 1124 n.5, 2008 A.M.C. at 688.
Id.;
See also Gulf Trading & Transp. Co. v. The MN Tento, 694 F.2d 1191, 1192 n.2, 1983
A.M.C. 872, 876 (9th Cir. 1992) and infra note 39.
Neither Malaysian law (the law of the defendant and the vessel's flag), Singaporean law
(the law of the bunker supplier), Taiwanese law (the law of the charterer), nor South Korean
law (the law of the place where bunkers were provided) provide for a maritime lien for the
provision of bunkers. See MARITIME LAW HANDBOOK, MALAYSIA 1-10, REPUBLIC OF
KOREA 1-3, 111-15-16, SINGAPORE 1-13 TAIWAN 111-12 (Hans-Chistian Albrecht & Roger
Heward eds., 2008).
Trans-Tec, 518 F.3d at 1123, 2008 A.M.C. at 687.
Id.at 1124, 2008 A.M.C. at 688.
Id.(quoting DeNicola v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 642 F.2d 5, 7 n. 2 (1st Cir.1981)).
Id. at 1123, 2008 A.M.C. at 688.
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of-law clause had been incorporated into the Bunker Confirmation. 44 Finally, if the
U.S. choice-of-law clause was effective, the court would determine whether the
FMLA applied to the parties. 5
According to the court, deciding which country's law governed contract
formation, and thus whether the U.S. choice-of-law clause had been incorporated
into the bunker contract, required putting the choice-of-law clause to one side and
46
looking at the contract without it.
When deciding which jurisdiction's law should govern contract formation in the
absence of choice-of-law clauses, federal courts apply a set of factors derived from
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Lauritzen v. Larsen.47 The Lauritzen
factors are: (1) the place of the wrongful act; (2) the law of the vessel's flag; (3)
the allegiance of the injured party; (4) the allegiance of the defendant shipowner;
(5) the place of contract; (6) the inaccessibility of a foreign forum; and (7) the law
of the forum.4 8 Rather than imposing a mechanical test, Ninth Circuit jurisprudence
holds that each factor may be given differing weight based upon the unique
circumstances of the contract. 49 The court also looked to the Restatement of
Conflict of Laws, which lists the place of negotiation, the place of performance,
and the place of business of each party as instructive.50 Equipped with Lauritzen
and the Restatement, the court agreed with the district court that Malaysian law
5
governed contract formation. '

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 1124, 2008 A.M.C. at 688.
Id.
Id. (citing DeNicola v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 642 F.2d 5, 7 n.2 (1st Cir. 1981)).
345 U.S. 571,1953 A.M.C. 1210(1953). See Trans-Tec, 518 F.3d at 1124 n.6.
Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 583-92, 1953 A.M.C. at 1219-26.
Trans-Tec, 518 F.3d at 1123, 2008 A.M.C. at 688 (citing Tento, 694 F.2d at 1194-95, 1983
A.M.C. at 876).
Id., 2008 A.M.C. at 689 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188

(1971).
51.

Id. at 1124. See Lower Court Decision, 437 F.Supp.2d at 1129, 2006 A.M.C. at 1014. The

most important contacts for the court were Splendid's nationality and the Harmony's flag:
both Malaysia. Trans-Tec, 518 F.3d at 1125, 2008 A.M.C. at 689. In this case, the court
held the fact that the bunkers were supplied in South Korea was unimportant. Id. While the
nationality of Trans-Tec, Singapore, was important, the court held without explanation that
the Malaysian contacts were more substantial. Id.
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. Applying Malaysian Law 2
The court cited a single case from the new Malaysian Court of Appeal: 53 Bauer
SDN BHD v. Daewoo Corp.54 Bauer involved a construction contract dispute
between a general and sub-contractor. 55 The first work order (contract) between the
parties contained a sweeping arbitration clause, and it was unclear whether later
work orders incorporated the first work order's arbitration clause. 56 Looking to the
extra-contractual interactions of the two parties, the court concluded that they had
treated their relationship as though the first work order had terminated, and so lost
effect, by the time the later work orders were signed.57 Thus there could be no
58
incorporation of the arbitration clause.
According to the Ninth Circuit, Bauer is "[t]he only relevant Malaysian
' 59
and "makes crystal-clear that Malaysian courts accord dispositive weight
to the 'words and actings' of the parties. 6 ° In Bauer, the court never spoke in
case[,]

55.
56.
57.

Malaysia is a common law jurisdiction like the United States. See LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE
WORLD 961-62 (Herbert M. Kritzer ed., 2002). With few exceptions, Malaysian law
imports wholesale England's civil common law prior to 1956, the year before Hari Merdeka
(Malaysian independence day). See [Malaysian] Civil Law Act of 1956 (Act 67); see also
TUN MOHAMED SUFFIAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MALAYSIAN LEGAL SYSTEM (2d ed.
1989). It continues to borrow a great deal of its jurisprudence from England, including
virtually all of its admiralty jurisprudence. Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief
and Brief of Malaysia as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Splendid Shipping
Sindirian Berhad v. Trans-Tec Asia, 129 S. Ct. 628 (No. 08-293), available at
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/l 1/08293 cert amicus malaysia.pdf ("Malaysia as a continental and insular state with numerous
offshore islands, is very interested in international maritime trade. Its maritime law is
identical with the law of the United Kingdom.") [hereinafter Motion for Leave to File
Amicus Curiae Brief and Brief of Malaysia as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners];
see, e.g., Minister of Finance v. Petrojasa Sdn Bhd, [2008] 4 M.L.J. 641 (Fed. Ct.),
Darahman bin Ibrahim & Ors v. Majlis Mesyuarat Kerajaan Negeri Perlis & Ors, [2008] 4
M.L.J. 309 (Ct. App.), Lembaga Tatatertib Peguam-Peguam v. Hoo Lin Coin & Anor,
[2008] 4 M.L.J. I (Fed. Ct.).
For a discussion of the structure of the Malaysian court system, see infra note 114.
Bauer SDN BHD v. Daewoo Corp., [1999] 4 M.L.J. 545 (Ct. App.). Bauer itself is an
example of Malaysia's continuing post-independence reliance on English admiralty law, as
it follows the judgment in British Crane Hire v. Ipswich Plant Hire, Ltd., [1975] Q.B. 303
(Eng.). See Trans-Tec, 518 F.3d at 1125-26.
Bauer, 4 M.L.J. at 545.
Id. at 554.
Id. at 560.

58.
59.

Id.
Trans-Tec, 518 F.3d at 1125.

52.

53.
54.

60. Id. (quoting Bauer,4 M.L.J. at 560).
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terms of "dispositive weight," and as the Ninth Circuit acknowledged, found the
"words and actings" of the parties before it insufficient to incorporate an
arbitration clause. 61 In fact, the Bauer court used the actions of the parties as a
means to defeat the choice of a non-Malaysian arbitral tribunal. 62
The Bunker Confirmation stated that it incorporated Trans-Tec's Terms and
Conditions, and so the Ninth Circuit held that Trans-Tec intended to incorporate
them. 63 Kien Hung never objected to the Bunker Confirmation, nor requested a
copy of the Terms and Conditions, even though it received the Confirmation one
week before the bunkers were delivered. 64 Based on these two factors and its
understanding of Bauer, the court held that Malaysian law was satisfied, so the
65
court could proceed into the more familiar waters of American law.

iL The Choice-of-Law Clause Under U.S. Law

The court then moved on to decide whether it should honor a U.S. choice of law
66
clause in a foreign contract between foreign parties, performed in a foreign port.
There was no discussion of whether a Malaysian court would have honored a U.S.
67
choice-of-law clause.
The Ninth Circuit considered the intention and actions of the parties to the
contract, Trans-Tec and Kien Hung, and not the third party to be bound by that
contract, Splendid. 68 Trans-Tec intended to bind foreign third-party owners such as
Splendid by its Terms and Conditions against their will, and the will of their
countries' courts. The Ninth Circuit found this to be fair if the vessel sails into a
U.S. port.69 According to the court, "[t]o take Splendid's approach would steer us
off course because it ignores ...the long-recognized principle of honoring the

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.; Bauer,4 M.L.J. at 560.
Id. at 563-64.
Trans-Tec, 518 F.3d at 1125-26.
Id. at 1126.
Id.
Id. The fact that a foreign third party would be bound to the contract was not considered.
This becomes more interesting when one considers the court's recommendation that other
countries may avoid U.S. choice-of-law clauses in similar situations by prohibiting
contracting parties from choosing U.S. law. See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.

68.
69.

Trans-Tec, 518 F.3dat 1126.
Id. at 1127.
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expectations of the parties to a contract[.] ' '70 The court found that its decision in
Gulf Trading & Transp. Co. v. The M/V Tento 7 1 supported this conclusion: after
conducting a Lauritzen analysis, the Tento court held that U.S. law72 should
nevertheless apply to the transaction in that case despite its "foreignness".
The facts and parties involved in Tento were not actually all that foreign. "The
Tento had significant trade at United States ports. The injured parties... were
United States companies approached by other United States companies in New
York City, and their agreements were made there. [It was] not [a] case of a United
States corporation entering into a supply agreement overseas with a foreign
company. There [were] not even any injured foreign parties." 73 In that case, a
Norwegian shipowner time-chartered the Norwegian-flagged Tento to an American
demise charterer, who sub-chartered it to another American. 74 The original charterparty stipulated that U.S. law would govern certain parts of the contract, 75 but that
the charterer was responsible for supplying his own fuel bunkers. 76 The subcharterer contacted an American fuel provider to order fuel bunkers; the fuel
provider hired an Italian company to deliver the bunkers in Italy. 77 The American
bunker provider paid the Italian company for its services, but was itself never
paid.78 The court held that the application of American law was appropriate
because of the great number of contacts with the United States, not in the face of
overwhelming foreignness.
The Ninth Circuit held that its conclusion was also in line with Fifth Circuit
precedent, which allows foreign parties to stipulate in their contracts that the
79
applicable lien law will be that of whichever jurisdiction the vessel sails into.
However, in Liverpool & London S.S. Prot. & Indem. v. M/V Queen of Leman, the
Fifth Circuit was considering a defendant confronted with a maritime lien where

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 1126.
Gulf Trading & Transp. Co. v. The MN Tento, 694 F.2d 1191, 1193 (9th Cir. 1982).
Trans-Tec, 518 F.3d at 1127 n.8.
Tento, 694 F.2d at 1196.
Id.
at 1192.
But not maritime liens. Id. at 1192, n.2.
Id.

77.

Id.

70.

78. Id
79. Trans-Tec, 518 F.3d at 1126-27 (citing Liverpool & London S.S. Prot. & Indem. Ass'n v.
Queen of Leman MV, 296 F.3d 350, (5th Cir. 2002)).

Trans-Tec Asia v. M/V Harmony Container

contrcting parties. 80
that defendant was actually one of the contracting
The Ninth Circuit refused to follow a case from the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, Rainbow Line, Inc. v. A/V Tequila,81 in which a
charterer claimed a maritime lien against a third-party creditor.8 2 Curiously, in
deciding to refuse to follow Tequila, the court found it noteworthy that the
adversely affected company in that case would have been a third party with no
relation to the contract. 83 Splendid, the adversely affected shipowner in Trans-Tec,
was itself a third party, so the distinction is not meaningful.

i. The FMLA
The court then went on to apply the Federal Maritime Lien Act to the Harmony.
Under U.S. law, the FMLA gives "a person providing necessaries to a vessel on
the order of... a person authorized by the owner... a maritime lien on the
vessel. 84 Charterers are presumed to have authority to bind the vessel in this way,
unless suppliers have actual knowledge that the charterer is not authorized by the
owner. 85 Prior to the decision in Trans-Tec, the common understanding was that
transactions outside the United States and not involving U.S. parties were not
86
subject to the FMLA.

80. Liverpool & London, supra note 79, at 355.
81. Rainbow Line, Inc. V. MN Tequila, 480 F.2d 1024 (2nd Cir. 1973).
82. Id.
83. Trans-Tee, 518 F.3d at 1127. While the court noted that the defendant in Tequila was even
further removed from the contract than Splendid, the rationale for not holding that third
party liable was that third-parties are by definition not at fault. Here the court acknowledged
that Splendid was not at fault.
84. 46 U.S.C. § 31342 (2006).
85. 46 U.S.C. § 31341 (2006).

86.

See FORCE ET AL., supra note 32, at 174-2 (2001). According to Force, "[t]ransactions
conducted outside of the United States and not involving U.S. parties are not subject to the
Federal Maritime Lien Act but may give rise to a lien under foreign law.... U.S. courts,
however, will apply U.S. law, including the FMLA, to protect an American supplier of fuel
to a foreign vessel in a U.S. port even if the supply contract was made in a foreign
jurisdiction. Id.(See generally Tento, 694 F.2d at 1191). Benedict's also takes this view.
"[T]here is no maritime lien under the Maritime Lien Act, 46 U.S.C. § 31342, for a foreign
supplier of goods and services to a foreign flag vessel in a foreign port." 2-111 Benedict on
Admiralty § 38 (citing Swedish Telecom Radio v. MN Discovery 1, 712 F. Supp. 1542
(S.D. Fla. 1989), reh'gdenied, 1990 A.M.C. 93 (S.D. Fla. 1989), recons. denied, 1991 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9715 (S.D. Fla. 1991) ; Trinidad Foundry & Fabricating Ltd. v. MV Kas
Camilla, 966 F.2d 613 (11th Cir. 1992), affig, 776 F. Supp.1558 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (citing
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Splendid argued that if the FMLA were extended to such transactions, it would
interfere with other countries' regulation of their maritime affairs; it would subject
nationals of countries that do not allow maritime liens for necessities to U.S. lien
law without their contracting in the U.S. or with a U.S. party.87 But the court did
not give credence to this position, holding that recognizing a maritime lien on the
Harmony does not interfere with Malaysian law 88 or "curb the sovereignty of any
other nation, or another country's ability to regulate its maritime affairs" because
[A] country could simply prohibit contracting parties from choosing United States or
foreign maritime lien law in their contracts. Alternatively, national law could require
charterers to inform suppliers of existing no-lien clauses in the charter-party. And, in the
ship owners could take steps to give suppliers notice of the no-lien
private arena,
89
provisions.

When the court refers to "national law," presumably this means foreign law. If so,
the FMLA's requirement of actual notice would defeat any foreign country's
requirement that charterers inform suppliers. 90 If a charterer that was required by
foreign law to inform its supplier of a no-lien provision did not do so, the supplier
would not have actual notice. While this would put the charterer in breach of
9
contract with the shipowner, this is cold comfort when the charterer is bankrupt. '
The other altemative for shipowners would be to give actual notice of no-lien
provisions to every one of their charterer's potential suppliers, a daunting task.
Not persuaded by Splendid's policy argument, the court went on to analyze the
plain language of the statute.92 It held that the statutory phrase: "a person providing
necessaries to a vessel" means "any person, not only an American person." 93 The
court did not distinguish between non-Americans and non-Americans not in the

89.
90.
91.
92.

Tramp Oil & Marine, Ltd. v. MN Mermaid 1,805 F.2d 42,46 (1st Cir. 1986)). It should be
noted, however, that all of the authorities cited by Benedict's were discussed and rejected
by Trans-Tec. Trans-Tec, 518 F.3d at 1131-33. Finally, see also In re Eagle Geophysical,
Inc., 256 B.R. 852, 857, (Bankr. D. Del. 2001) ("[Plaintiff] has not cited a single case which
grants a maritime lien for necessities to a foreign vessel provided outside the United States.
In the absence of any supporting authority, we disallow [plaintiffs] claimed maritime
lien.").
Trans-Tec, 518 F.3d at 1131.
As proof of its careful consideration and non-interference with Malaysian law, the court
noted that it applied Malaysian law. See id. at 1131.
Id.
at 1131 &n.10.
See supra text accompanying note 84.
Kien Hung is an example of this problem. See Trans-Tec, 518 F.3d at 1122.
See Trans-Tec, 518 F.3d at 1130.

93.

Id.

87.
88.
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United States. The court was also not persuaded by Splendid's argument that all
legislation carries a presumption that Congress did not intend for it to have effect
outside the United States. 94 Ultimately, the court did subject Splendid to the
FMLA. 95 It held that, because the language of the FMLA does not explicitly
prohibit its extraterritorial application, it may apply anywhere and to any party.96

IV. Discussion: Applying Malaysian Law
Should the Ninth Circuit have allowed Trans-Tec to bind Splendid through its
contract with Kien Hung? If some of the parties involved had been American, the
answer would have been "yes., 97 In Trans-Tec, the court saw the most important
issue as whether the FMLA could be applied extraterritorially to foreign parties
doing business overseas with foreign vessels. 98 It largely overlooked a more
important and more far-reaching question: What does it mean for a court to apply
foreign law?
Imagine a foreign jurisdiction's body of law as an apothecary's cabinet with
numerous drawers arranged in rows. One of the many rows might be called
"contracts," made up of drawers with labels such as "what constitutes an offer,"
"acceptance by performance," and of course "choice-of-law clauses." When
dealing with a choice-of-law clause problem, a federal court applying that foreign
jurisdiction's law has two options:
1. Pull out one of the drawers and apply only its contents to the facts, or
2. Consider the contents of the entire cabinet, trying as best it can to

94.

Id.Splendid relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281,
285 (1949) (subscribing to the canon of construction that Congress is presumed not to
intend its legislation apply extraterritorially, unless a contrary intent is apparent) (citing
Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932)). On a similar note, the Supreme
Court more recently held that it "ordinarily construes ambiguous statutes to avoid
unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other nations .... This rule of
statutory construction cautions courts to assume that legislators take account of the
legitimate sovereign interests of other nations when they write American laws. It thereby
helps the potentially conflicting laws of different nations work together in harmony-a
harmony particularly needed in today's highly interdependent commercial world." F.
Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164-65 (2004).
95. Trans-Tec, 518 F.3dat 1134.
96. See id.
at 1131.
97. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
98. Trans-Tec, 518 F.3dat 1124.
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come to the same conclusion the foreign court would.
When a federal court applies U.S. state law, option two is expected and
substitution of substantive federal law is not allowed if it promotes forum
shopping. 99 Following option two would benefit the foreign jurisdiction whose law
is being applied, and lead to greater comity. One may assume that U.S. courts, too,
would rather see a foreign court apply U.S. law to U.S. defendants in precisely the
same way the U.S. court would. Instead, the general practice within the United
States has been to follow option one, filling any gaps in the little foreign law the
court has before it with U.S. law. 100 One might grimace to imagine a U.S.
defendant before a Burmese court applying U.S. law, and filling in the gaps with
local law.
In 1972, the Supreme Court warned against this kind of parochialism in MIS
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.10 1 Prior to the decision in Bremen, U.S. courts
were willing to strike down foreign forum selection and choice-of-law clauses
because they "oust[ed] the [rightful] jurisdiction of the courts," and so were
"contrary to public policy. 1 0° 2 This effectively led to U.S. courts refusing private
03
agreements to settle disutes in foreign jurisdictions.1
Bremen is perhaps most famous for its holding that foreign choice-of-law
14
clauses are to be honored, and the Trans-Tec court was quick to point this out. 0
However, the rationale in Bremen for giving effect to a U.K. choice-of-law clause
does not support the decision to honor the choice-of-law clause in Trans-Tec.
According to the Court in Bremen, not honoring such agreements would be "a
heavy hand indeed on the future development of international commercial dealings
by Americans. We cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and
international waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved

99.

See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938); see also Stoot v. Fluor Drilling
Serv., Inc., 851 F.2d 1514, 1517 (5th Cir. 1988); accord Hale v. Co-Mar Offshore Corp.,

588 F.Supp. 1212, 1215 (W.D.La.1984).
100. Louise Ellen Teitz, From the Courthouse in Tobago to the Internet: The IncreasingNeed to
Prove Foreign Law in US Courts, 34 J. MAR. L. & COM. 98 (2003) (discussing the use of

evidence in Admiralty proceedings).
101. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
102. Carbon Black Exp., Inc. v. S.S. Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297, 300-01 (5th Cir. 1958), cert.
dismissed, 359 U.S. 180 (1959).
103. See Bremen, 407 U.S. at 8-9.
104. Trans-Tec, 518 F.3d at 1126, 2008 A.M.C. at 691.
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in our courts."' 0 5 This is precisely what the decision in Trans-Tec does. Although
U.S. law does not generally allow contracting parties to bind a third party, the legal
fiction that liens attach to the vessel and not the third party shipowner makes it
possible for charterers and suppliers to bind shipowners.' 0 6 Besides the United
States, France, and those countries that signed onto the 1926 Brussels Convention,
07
other countries do not allow maritime liens for the provision of necessaries.
Malaysia, through which law the Bunker Confirmation and Terms and Conditions
had to pass to reach the U.S. choice-of-law clause, does not recognize a lien for
08
providing bunkers.1
Of course, option one is the easier of the two, but, for a number of reasons,
option two is no longer the near-impossible task it once was. The Internet and
other sources "make research into international and foreign law faster and easier,
while judicial assistance initiatives, conferences, and visits promote awareness of
the relevance of these sources of law."' 0 9 Since 1966, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure have allowed federal courts to apply any relevant foreign authority they
10
can find, whether introduced by the parties or not.

105. See Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9, 1972 A.M.C. at 1413. See also Romero v. Int'l Terminal
Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 382-383, 1959 A.M.C. 832, 854 ("The controlling
considerations are the interacting interests of the United States and of foreign countries.").
106. FORCE ETAL, supra note 32, at 163.
107. Trans-Tec, 518 F.3d at 1123 n.4, 2008 A.M.C. at 687 n.4; International Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Maritime Liens and Mortgages, May 27, 1967.
108. Malaysia, like England, recognizes four types of liens: (I) The damage lien. MARITIME
LAW HANDBOOK, MALAYSIA 1-12 (Hans-Christian Albrecht & Roger Heward eds., 2008).
When damage is done by a vessel, but only if at the "material time" the vessel was in the
hands of the owner or a demise-charterer. Id. A Malaysian court would thus not allow such
a lien for damage caused by a time-charterer like Kien Hung. (2) The salvage lien. Id.This
attaches to a vessel as the result of a successful salvage. Id. In these cases, the type of
charter involved is irrelevant. Id. (3) The crew wages lien. Id.Crew have a lien over the
vessel on which they actually served. Id. Here, also, the type of charter involved is
irrelevant. Id. (4) The master's disbursement lien. Id.This arises in favor of a master for all
outstanding disbursements, but only if the true owner of the vessel is personally liable for
the claim, and no lien arises if the disbursements were incurred on behalf of any charterer
(emphasis added). Id. Malaysia also in theory still recognizes liens arising out of bottomry,
but as a practical matter such liens no longer exist there.
109. Karen Knop, Here and There: InternationalLaw in Domestic Courts, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.
& POL. 501, 519-20 (2000) (citing Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial
Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 99 (1994); Claire L'Heureux-Dubd, The Importance
of Dialogue: Globalization and the InternationalImpact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA
L.J. 15, 16-27 (1998)).
110. FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1. Still, federal judges have been slow to apply foreign law, often opting
to employ the more familiar law of the forum. Louise Ellen Teitz, The Use of Evidence in
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Courts need not shoulder the entire burden of researching foreign law. The
parties to a suit must bear the lion's share of responsibility for doing so, since
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1 only permits rather than requires the court to
do its own research."' In a case where the parties do their own thorough research,
the court can count on each side's efforts to satisfy option two, but this will not
happen unless parties feel that courts will take their research seriously.
In Trans-Tec, the parties provided the court with citations to a few Malaysian
112
cases, along with other Commonwealth cases that Malaysian courts have cited. 3
law."1
Splendid provided citations, while Trans-Tec's filings cited only American
Splendid did not research or cite Malaysian law as thoroughly as it could
have." 4 Its brief addressed two issues: First, the narrow question of whether,

Admiralty Proceedings,34 J. MAR. L. & COM. 97 (2003). Teitz, supra note 100, at 97.

111. FED. R. CIv. P. 44.1.
112. See e.g., Bauer v. Daewoo Corp., [1999] 4 M.L.J. 545 (Ct. App.); Concordia Agritrading
Pte. v. Cornelder Hoogewerff Pte., [2001] 1 S.L.R. 222 (H.C. Singapore); Anonymous
Greek Co. of Gen. Assurances v. Ethniki AIG Europe, [2000] I.L. Pr. 426 (U.K.).
113. Compare Appellee's Principal and Response Brief at x-xi, Trans-Tec Asia v. MN Harmony
Container, 518 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2006) (Nos. 06-55355, 06-55396) [hereinafter
Appellee's Brief], with Appellant's Reply Brief and Response to Cross-Appeal at ii-vi,
Trans-Tec Asia v. MV Harmony Container, 518 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2006) (Nos. 06-55355,
06-55396) [hereinafter Appellant's Brief].
114. A brief primer on Malaysian law is in order. As a British colony from 1824 until 1957,
Malaysia's legal system has many English characteristics. See SUFFIAN, supra note 52, at v.
Malaysia, in terms of commercial law, is a common law jurisdiction based on the English
model and received all its substantive commercial law from the British. Foreign Law
Guides, Malaysia at 2, available at http://foreignlawguide.com/ip/ (subscription service;
also on file with author). This is especially true in matters of admiralty. See MARITIME LAW
HANDBOOK, supra note 108, at 1-10. Law is also derived from a number of other sources,
either in general or in specialized courts, as discussed below. Those other sources include
federal and state constitutions, acts of the federal Parliament and ordinances of state
legislatures, administrative agencies' rules and regulations, Syariah (Shari'ah) (Muslim
law), Hindu law, and local customary law. See SUFFIAN, supra note 52, at 92.
Malaysian courts are also federal, but in a much different manner from those of the United States.
Most importantly, federal and state courts do not have concurrent jurisdiction like U.S.
courts. See id. at 58. With notable exceptions, all laws-both federal and state-are
enforced in federal courts. Id. Some of those exceptions include the Syariah courts which
apply Muslim Syariah law only to Muslims due to laws protecting freedom of religion, and
the native courts of East Malaysia (Borneo) which enforce Adat (local customary law). Id.
at 82-90.
Within the federal system, there are three levels of standard courts, in order of ascending
authority: the High Courts of Malaya and Sabah/Sarawak, the Court of Appeal, and the
Federal Court. LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD, supra note 52, at 961. Below these are the
subordinate courts. Session courts have criminal jurisdiction over all cases where the death
penalty is not sought or civil cases where less than $ 100,000 is at stake. Subordinate Courts
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between Trans-Tec and Kien Hung, Malaysian law would allow the unsigned
1 5
Bunker Confirmation to incorporate by reference the Terms and Conditions."
Second, it partially addressed the wider issue of whether a Malaysian court would
apply maritime liens their law does not recognize. 1 6 Splendid's discussion of
Malaysian maritime lien law is sparse and makes numerous uncited claims. For
example, Splendid claims that "Malaysian law does not recognize liens created
under foreign law unless Malaysia itself recognizes the underlying claim as giving
rise to a lien," without citing an authority.'' 7 Instead, it justifies this conclusion
based on the fact that "[n]o Malaysian authority exists holding liens not allowed by
Malaysia may be enforced elsewhere[.]" ' 1 8 Few lawyers would feel as comfortable
using "the court never held it would, thus it definitely would not" logic in relation
to U.S. decisions."19
Despite its thin citation of Malaysian precedent, Splendid does argue the court
should apply Malaysian law according to option two: "If Malaysian law is to be
applied at all, it should apply to the entire agreement [and not just whether
Malaysian courts generally honor amendments to contracts such as the Terms and
Conditions].' 120 Accomplishing that would require the court to mimic a Malaysian
court.

L A Wider View: Wearing a Malaysian Hat

A more faithful application of Malaysian law to a maritime lien dispute cannot
be made without an understanding of that country's maritime laws. Original
jurisdiction over maritime cases is granted to the High Courts of Malaysia by

Act 1987, §§ 64-65(1). Below these are magistrate courts, which can hear criminal cases
bearing up to a ten-year penalty and civil cases worth up to $10,000. Id. §§ 85,87. Finally,
there are small claims courts and juvenile courts.
115. See Appellee's Brief, supra note 113, at 35-43.
116. Id. at 32-35.
117. Id. at 34.

118. Id.
119. As Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's warned, "the absence of evidence is
not the evidence of absence."
Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, U.S. Dep't of Defense, DoD News Briefing Secretary
Rumsfeld
and Gen.
Myer, (Feb
12,
2002),
available at
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2636.
120. Appellee's Brief, supra note 113, at 34.
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Section 24(b) of the revised Courts of Judicature Act 1964.121 That jurisdiction is
based on the United Kingdom's Supreme Court Act 1981, Chapter 54, Sections 2024.122 As discussed earlier, Malaysia has inherited a great deal of its jurisprudence
from England and Singapore, and continues to import decisions from those

121. The Courts of Judicature Act 1964 section 24(b) reads:
Civil jurisdiction--specific
Without prejudice to the generality of section 23 the civil jurisdiction of the High Court
shall include-

(b) the same jurisdiction and authority in relation to matters of admiralty as is had by the
High Court of Justice in England under the United Kingdom Supreme Court Act 1981;..
Malaysia Act § 91.24, amended by Act of Nov.], 1972.
122.Sections 21 (2)-(4) are of particular interest in cases regarding maritime liens. They
read:
Mode of exercise of Admiralty jurisdiction:

(2) In the case of any such claim as is mentioned in section 20(2)(a), (c) or (s) or any
such question as is mentioned in section 20(2)(b), an action in rem may be brought in the
High Court against the ship or property in connection with which the claim or question
arises.
(3) In any case in which there is a maritime lien or other charge on any ship, aircraft or
other property for the amount claimed, an action in rem may be brought in the High
Court against that ship, aircraft or property.
(4) In the case of any such claim as is mentioned in section 20(2)(e) to (r), where(a) the claim arises in connection with a ship; and
(b) the person who would be liable on the claim in an action in personam ("the relevant
person") was, when the cause of action arose, the owner or charterer of, or in possession
or in control of, the ship, an action in rem may (whether or not the claim gives rise to a
maritime lien on that ship) be brought in the High Court against(i) that ship, if at the time when the action is brought the relevant person is either the
beneficial owner of that ship as respects all the shares in it or the charterer of it under a
charter by demise; or
(ii) any other ship of which, at the time when the action is brought, the relevant person is
the beneficial owner as respects all the shares in it.
Supreme Court Act, 1981, ch. 54, §§ 20-24.
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jurisdictions, including whole statutes in the case of England. 123 This is especially
true in admiralty, where the Rules of the High Court 1980 explain, "in the exercise
of the admiralty jurisdiction as well as the substantive law, there is no relevant
difference" between the law of Malaysia, England, and Singapore. 124
Singaporean courts refuse to honor foreign choice-of-law clauses when they are
contrary to public policy, like U.S. courts prior to Bremen. 125 There, courts will
interfere with the autonomy of contracting parties for public policy reasons. 126 One
public policy reason for overriding a foreign choice-of-law clause exists when the
parties choose a foreign forum purely to avoid the application of local law. 127 This
also goes for parties that choose Singapore law over their own country's law. 128 In
Peh Teck Quee v. Bayerische Landesbank Girozentrale, the Singapore Court of
Appeal held that it would not honor a Singapore choice-of-law clause if it was
inserted solely to avoid Malaysian law, the default law of the parties.' 29 Some
acceptable reasons to choose a foreign forum are that one of the parties operates
from that jurisdiction or that all its accounts are located there. 130 The court did
honor the choice of law clause in that case, reasoning that the purpose of the
Singapore choice-of-law clause was not just to avoid Malaysian law, although that
may have been one reason. 131
Unlike the parties in Peh Teck Quee, Trans-Tec chose U.S. law for the express
purpose of avoiding the maritime lien law of many of the jurisdictions in which it
operates. 132 Trans-Tec's Terms and Conditions state, "The laws of the United
States shall apply with respect to the existence of a maritime lien, regardless of the

123. See LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD, supra note 52.

124. Rules of the High Court 1980, Order 70, R. I, § 5 (on file with author) (citing "Halcyon
Isle" Bankers Trust Int'l Ltd v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 2 M.L.J. 217 (Privy Council App.
1980)). Malaysia abolished appeals to the Privy Council in England in stages: on January 1,
1978 appeals in constitutional and criminal matters were abolished, and all other appeals to
the Privy Council were abolished on January 1, 1985. SUFFIAN, supra note 52, at 62. All
Privy Council appeals from Malaysia decided before those dates is still good law. Id.
125. See Breman, supra note 102.
126. Peh Teck Quee v. Bayerische Landesbank Girozentrale, 1 S.L.R. 148, 153 (Ct. App. 2000)
(Singapore).
127. Id. at 154.
128. Id.
129. Id
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Trans-Tec, 518 F.3d at 1122, 2008 A.M.C. at 687.
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country in which Seller takes legal action."' 33 The only reason to include such a
clause is to avoid the operation of Trans-Tec's own Singaporean lien laws, as well
as those of the majority of its clients.
The courts of the United Kingdom have seen a case which facts are nearly
identical to Trans-Tec. In The Yuta Bondarovskaya, the Admiralty Division
considered a case in which a Norwegian company time-chartered a ship, the Yuta
Bondarovskaya, to a British charterer. 134 The charter-party forbade the charterer
from binding the vessel with liens. 135 During a voyage, the charterer arranged for a
non-American supplier to supply bunkers to the vessel.1 36 The supplier's terms and
conditions stated that all bunker sales would be made in accordance with the laws
137
of the United States, and so grant it a lien against any ship it supplies. Taking the
opposite tack from the Ninth Circuit, the Admiralty Division held that a charterer
must be expressly authorized to buy necessaries on the vessel's credit. 138 The court
held that it is "almost inconceivable" to assume a charterer has authority to bind a
vessel. 139
The court found that a necessities supplier has an option to avoid uncertainty of
payment: demand payment up front for necessities. 140 This option provided to
suppliers is much more realistic and reliable than a shipowner's option under
Trans-Tec: to give actual notice to every potential supplier that its charterer has no
authority to bind the vessel.
Were a Malaysian court to have heard Trans-Tec, it would naturally consider
English admiralty cases when making its judgment. Given that Malaysia claims
"[i]ts maritime law is identical with the law of the United Kingdom,"' 14 1 it is
unlikely a Malaysian court would have come to the decision in Trans-Tec allowing

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id.
Yuta Bondarovskaya, [1998] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 357 (EWHC (QB) 1997).
Id.
Id.
Id. at361.
Id.
at 362.
Id.; "I can see no reason why an owner, or ...a demise charterer, should agree [to] any
such thing, especially since in practice the supplier would only be likely to claim directly
against the owner or demise charterer in circumstances in which the supplier was not paid
by his immediate customer, the time charterer, because of insolvency."
Yuta Bondarovskaya, [1998] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 362.
140. Id.
at 358.
141. Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief and Brief of Malaysia as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioners, supra note 52, at I.
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U.S. law to govern rather than the decision the Admiralty Division reached.
Neither the court nor the parties in Trans-Tec cite any relevant Malaysian
caselaw, but that country is not without its own precedent on foreign choice-of-law
clauses' 42 In the admiralty case of Kai Tai Timber Co. Hong Kong v. Inter
Maritime Mgmt SDN BHD, the Court of Appeal upheld Malaysian jurisdiction in
the face of an exclusive Japanese choice-of-law clause.' 43 The defendant was a
Malaysian resident, and the vessel at issue was flagged in Malaysia. 144 The court
held that this made Malaysia the most appropriate forum for the case, and ignored
45

the choice-of-law clause. 1

Kai Tai Timber is not the only available Malaysian case that takes this view. In
Globus Shipping & Trading Co. v. Taiping Textiles BHD, the Federal Court of
Malaysia 146 held that "where a cause of action in respect of any dispute in relation
to a contract arises and is therefore properly within [a Malaysian high court's]
jurisdiction, the court has a discretion whether or not to adjudicate upon the claim
in the action even where the parties have agreedto refer such dispute to a foreign
147

court[.]'

142. Malaysian decisions, however, refer to them as "foreign jurisdiction clauses." See, e.g.,
Inter Mar. Mgmt. SDN BHD v. Kai Tai Timber Co. H.K., [1995] 1 M.L.J. 322, 331 (Ct.
App. Kuala Lumpur). This may explain why Splendid's attorneys did not encounter them in
their research.
143. id. Decisions of the Court of Appeal bind all lower courts, including the high courts. See
Jurisdiction of the Court, Laman Web Rasmi Mahkamah Malaysia - Malaysian Court
Official Web, http://www.kehakiman.gov.my/courts/judicialEN.shtml (last visited Oct. 17,
2008).
144. See Kai Tai Timber, [1995] 1 M.L.J. at 330-31.
145. Id.Note that the party insisting on the foreign choice-of-law clause was the Malaysian
defendant, and not the foreign plaintiff. Id. at 331.
146. The Federal Court was first established in 1963. Globalex, An Overview of Malaysian Legal
System and Research, Feb. 2008, http://www.nyulawglobal.org/Globalex/Malaysia.htm. At
that time, the federal courts were arranged in a three-tier system, as they are today. Id. In
1985, the federal court system was collapsed into a binary system: the high courts, and
above them the Supreme Court, before finally being reconstituted as a three-tier system,
with the Supreme Court being called the Federal Court again. SUFFIAN, supra note 52, at
62.95% of the Federal Court's caseload consists of appeals from lower courts. Id. at 63. As
the supreme judicial body, the Federal Court's decisions bind all Malaysian courts except
itself. Id. at 93. Nevertheless, the Federal Court is unlikely to overturn one of its own
decision, and usually only does so once every three to four years. Id.
147. Globus Shipping & Trading Co. v. Taiping Textiles BHD, [1976] 2 M.L.J. 154 (Fed. Ct.)
(emphasis added); see also American Express Bank Ltd. v. Mohamed Toufic AI-Ozeir,
[1995] 1 M.L.J. 160, 161 (Fed. Ct.) ("The Malaysian court was not precluded from
exercising its discretion whether to hear the case merely because of the foreign jurisdiction
clauses specifying the laws and courts of Singapore.").
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After reading Kai Tai Timber and Globus Shipping, the Ninth Circuit's blanket

holding that "Malaysian courts accord dispositive weight to the 'words and
actings' of the parties"' 148 is puzzling. In both Malaysian cases, the court refused to
honor foreign jurisdiction clauses where both contracting parties had actual
knowledge of those clauses, unlike Kien Hung in Trans-Tec.
Malaysian courts do not allow a charterer to bind the shipowner for provision of
repairs if the owner was not a party to the bunker contract.149 In The M/V Yamato
Maru, a high court 50 held that when a vessel is chartered out during all times
material to a repair contract, the shipowner is not liable for the cost of those
repairs.' 51 This is telling, since a shipowner is more likely to see a personal benefit
from repairs than it would when bunkers are supplied to her charterer. When
152
repairs are done on a vessel, the only way the repairer could proceed in rem
against that vessel would be if the party to be affected by the arrest (the current
operator) was the party which contracted for those repairs: If "there was no
contract, express or implied, between the owners and the repairers... [then] there
53
was no liability on the owners when the cause of action arose."'
In fact, the situation faced by the Yamato Maru court is quite similar to TransTec. In the charter-party, the shipowner forbade the charterer from allowing any
liens to attach to the vessel, except for crews wages or salvage, and required it to
inform all supplier of the no-lien provision.' 54 Because of these clauses, the court
concluded "it cannot be held that, unless the owners bound themselves specifically
with the agents, they would be liable for the claim the plaintiffs have against the

148. Trans-Tec, 518 F.3d at 1125.
149. The MN Yamato Maru, [1977] 2 M.L.J. 41,44 (Malaya).
150. "A legal ruling by a High Court judge binds all subordinate courts, but not other High Court
judges, though they would treat it with respect and hesitate not to follow it without good
reason." SUFFIAN, supra note 52, at 62 (citing Sundralingam v. Ramanatha Chettiar, [1966]
2 M.L.J. 293).
151. The Yamato Maru, 2 M.L.J. at 44 (citing The St. Merriel, [1963] I Lloyd's Rep. 63 (P.
1963) (U.K.)).
152. In Malaysian law, being able to proceed in rem is not synonymous with having a lien
against the vessel. See MARITIME LAW HANDBOOK, Malaysia 1-13 (Hans-Christian
Albrecht & Roger Heward eds., 2008).
153. The Yamato Maru, 2 M.L.J. at 44.
154. Id. Crews' wages and salvage are two of the four liens Malaysian courts recognize. See
International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Maritime Liens
and Mortgages, supra note 107.
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charterers."
Splendid's charter-party with Kien Hung also forbade the charterer from
incurring liens.' 56 Given Malaysia's views on public policy in regard to choice-oflaw clauses and its refusal to allow charterers and suppliers to bind shipowners, it
is highly unlikely that a Malaysian court would allow a Singaporean and a
Taiwanese company to override the rights of a Malaysian citizen the way the Ninth
Circuit did in Trans-Tec.

iL An Alternative for the Faint of Heart

If courts do not have the stomach for wading through an unfamiliar body of law
to the depth needed for proper application, there is another alternative: forum non
conveniens. In fact, prior to Trans-Tec, the Ninth Circuit espoused transferring
cases that required a thorough familiarity with foreign law to those foreign
forums.1 57 This would have been appropriate in a case such as Trans-Tec, where
U.S. law could not apply until the Malaysian issues were addressed. While it is not
currently done, there is no reason that the court could not transfer the case to
Malaysia with instructions as to how U.S. law would play out if the Malaysian
court allowed the choice-of-law clause. This would ensure the proper application
of each country's laws while keeping additional costs to a minimum.

V. Conclusion
L The Effect of Trans-Tec

Trans-Tec has the potential to give shipowners and sovereigns around the world
extreme anxiety. Shipowners, wherever they are located, cannot charter out their
vessels under any kind of charter-party without fear that the charterer will run up a

155. The Yamato Maru, 2 M.L.J. at 45.
156. Trans-Tec, 518 F.3dat 1129.
157. Menken v. Emm, 503 F.3d 1050, 1063 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,
454 U.S. 235, 241 (1981); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 509 (1947)). Of course,
per FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1, if a party fails to plead or prove foreign law, the court is free to
apply forum law. Lien Huynh v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 465 F.3d 992, 1001 (9th Cir.
2006).
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tab for the shipowner that its own country would not allow and in the face of
whatever reasonable effort the shipowner makes to protect himself. Giving actual
notice to every potential necessaries supplier is simply not a reasonable solution.
Sovereigns too have little power to insulate their citizens because any law they
may pass requiring parties to inform each other about no-lien provisions would be
pointless in light of the Ninth Circuit's decision that suppliers without actual
notice of liens are not bound by them.

ii. Moving Forward
On October 2, 2008, Splendid petitioned the Supreme Court of the United
States for certiorari. 158 The question it presented to the Court bears more on the
Ninth Circuit's understanding of the FMLA than on its application of foreign
law.

159

Despite the Ninth Circuit's claim to the contrary, its decision in Trans-Tec does
interfere with Malaysian law, curb the sovereignty of other nations, and hamper
their ability to regulate their maritime affairs. The government of Malaysia itself
has announced as much to the Supreme Court in its request for leave to file a brief
as amicus curiae. 160 Further, that brief explains that Malaysian law would never
"have allowed a third party to impose a lien against a ship for the supply of
bunkers or other 'necessaries."161

This Supreme Court needed to be address this state of confusion, because it is
the only tribunal which could announce a uniform rule to clear up the confusion
Trans-Tec left in its wake. On December 1, 2008, though, the Court refused
certiorari, leaving precedent among the circuits in contradiction.' 62 In the absence

158. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Splendid Shipping Sendirian Berhard v. Trans-Tec Asia,
No. 08-293 (Sept. 2, 2008) 2008 WL 4103272.
159. Id. at i. The issue as defined by Splendid's petition is,
[m]ay a foreign supplier, by use of a U.S. choice-of-law clause in a sales contract with a
foreign vessel's foreign charterer, nevertheless extend the application of the FMLA in
order to create a U.S. maritime lien for goods that it furnished to the foreign vessel in a
foreign port, as held below by the Ninth Circuit ... ?

Id.
160. Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief and Brief of Malaysia as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioners, supra note 52, at I.
161. Id.
162. Splendid Shipping SDN BHD v. Trans-Tec Asia, 129 S. Ct. 628, 2008 WL 4106794 (Dec.
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of guidance from the Court, companies such as Trans-Tec will remain able to bind
foreign shipowners that do not give suppliers actual notice, so long as the chartered
ships pull into a West Coast port. This state of affairs may not last forever, but in
the meantime shipowners have a lot of phone calls to make.

1,2008).

8 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (2010)

